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This Article critically examines the success of Title IX in eradicating sexual 
harassment in educational settings after the Supreme Court decisions in Gebser v. Lago 
and Monroe v. Davis. Regrettably, the high bar for recovery established by these cases, 
in addition to poor administrative enforcement of Title IX have eroded its ability to 
maintain discrimination-free schools. After an examination of the manner in which the 
Canadian human rights model operates in the context of sexual harassment in educational 
settings, recommendations are made that the United States should use the Canadian 
example to improve its own system. Specifically, the United States should streamline and 
simplify its administrative enforcement of Title IX and articulate clearer legal standards 
for injunctive relief as opposed to recovery of compensatory damages.   
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3“For centuries, students were sexually harassed, but the law offered neither a label 
nor a remedy”1 Even though the United States now has a legal remedy for sexual 
harassment in schools, it has failed to deal adequately with the problem.2 This failure 
“compromises students’ educational experience and legitimates sexual abuse. A society 
truly committed to gender equality needs to lay better foundations among its youth.”3
I. INTRODUCTION 
Congress enacted Title IX of the Education Amendments of 19724 with the noble 
aim of eliminating sex discrimination in educational programs receiving federal funding.5
Under Title IX, sexual harassment is considered discrimination on the basis of sex, and is 
therefore also prohibited in education programs receiving federal funding.6
Unfortunately, the good intentions of Congress have not resulted in a reduction of 
reported incidents of sexual harassment in educational programs in the United States.7
On the contrary, sexual harassment in schools is often tolerated or condoned.8
There are a myriad of reasons to account for the lackluster performance of Title 
IX in the context of sexual harassment in schools. Notably, recent Title IX sexual 
harassment jurisprudence has set legal standards for recovery of compensatory damages 
 
1 Deborah Rhode, Sex in Schools: Who’s Minding the Adults?, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
LAW 290 (Catherine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004). 
2 Id. at 291. 
3 Id.
4 28 U.S.C. § 1681(a) et seq. (1972). 
5 See generally Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).  
6 See 28 U.S.C. 1681(a); see also Gebser v. Lago, 524 U.S. 274 (1998).  
7 American Association of University Women. Hostile Hallways: Bullying, Teasing and Sexual 
Harassment in School (2001), available at www.aauw.org/researchgirls_education/hostile.cfm/ (last visited 
Oct. 11, 2005) [hereinafter Hostile Hallways]. The 2001 study cited above was conducted by the American 
Association for University Women and investigated sexual harassment in secondary schools in order to 
compare the present situation with the results obtained from their initial study in 1993. Id. The 
overwhelming conclusion of the study is that sexual harassment still exists at a high level in American 
schools. Id.
8 See Rhode, supra note 1, at 290. Rhode argues that the challenge is to “increase the accountability 
throughout the educational process.” Id.
4so high that plaintiffs are often deterred from initially filing cases.9 Not unpredictably, if 
sexual harassment victims are not filing cases, effective redress of sexual harassment in 
schools is consequently frustrated. In addition, when discussing the remedy provided to 
victims of sexual harassment in schools, recent case law is focused almost exclusively on 
compensatory damages, thereby undermining an opportunity to provide proactive 
compliance enforcement, such as declaratory or injunctive relief, to schools that fail to 
implement educational programs, policies, or grievance schemes to reduce hostile 
environments in schools.10 Lastly, the administrative enforcement scheme of Title IX is 
ineffectual and fails to provide any real teeth to the Congress’ statutory mandate of 
discrimination-free educational environments.11 
In Canada, on the other hand, sexual harassment is a violation of the dignity-and 
equality-based human rights codes.12 Violations of these codes are tried under special 
human rights tribunals, which are flexible adjudicatory bodies that have broad authority 
to remedy violations and implement programs to aid in preventing future harm.13 
The Canadian system is arguably better at effectively redressing human rights 
violations as compared to the analogous system in United States. First, the Canadian 
Human Rights administrative and judicial enforcement systems are streamlined to handle 
 
9 See discussion infra Part II.C.3-4. 
10 Gebser, 524 U.S. at 288, provided a legal standard for recovery of compensatory damages, but did not 
address or clarify a legal standard for other equitable relief. This is somewhat ironic, considering that the 
majority stated in Gebser that Title IX focuses more on protecting individuals from discriminatory 
practices carried out by recipients of federal funds than on compensating victims of discrimination. Id. at 
274. See also discussion infra Part II.C.  
11 See generally American Association of University Women, License for Bias: Sex Discrimination, 
Schools, and Title IX, Legal Advocacy Fund (2000) [hereinafter License for Bias]. 
12 See generally Chantal Richard, Surviving Student to Student Sexual Harassment: Legal Remedies and 
Prevention Programmes, 16 DALHOUSIE L.J. 169 (1997), for a discussion of Canadian Human Rights 
Legislation and its application to sexual harassment litigation.  
13 Id. See also discussion of Canadian sexual harassment suits infra Part III.D. 
5all human rights violations at both the provincial and federal levels.14 This streamlined 
system arguably translates into more efficient and effective redress and prevention of 
violations.15 Second, Canadian jurisprudence has repeatedly emphasized that the human 
rights codes are to be interpreted broadly in order to most effectively carry out their 
purpose of equal opportunity and freedom from discrimination.16 Third, the legal 
standard of recovery for discrimination (including sexual harassment) in an educational 
environment is clearly articulated, and is the same for both injunctive and compensatory 
damages.17 This Canadian standard does not set the bar for plaintiffs nearly as high as the 
compensatory damage standard in place in the United States.18 
The United States should learn from the Canadian example. While it is not 
possible for the United States to rewrite its civil rights laws to mirror those of Canada, 
domestic courts should explore legal standards and avenues for relief that allow the 
purpose of Title IX to be better effectuated.19 This purpose would be better served, for 
instance, if the standard of recovery for injunctive relief was clearly articulated as a 
negligence standard, as opposed to the higher standard currently in place for 
compensatory damage relief.20 The United States should also learn from the streamlined 
administrative enforcement of Human Rights Codes in Canada, and restructure and 
 
14 See discussion infra Part III.C. 
15 See generally Erika Chamberlain, A Classical Perspective on the Modern Workplace: The Aristotelian 
Conflict in Sexual Harassment Litigation, 15 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 3, 4 (2002). 
16 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
17 See discussion infra Part III.C. 
18 Compare cases cited infra Parts II.C and III.C. 
19 Interview with Jennifer Drobac, Professor, Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis (Feb. 2, 2006) 
[hereinafter Drobac interview].  
20 See discussion infra Part II.C.4. 
6equalize civil rights enforcement agencies in the United States so that sexual harassment 
in any context or setting is redressed with uniform effectiveness and authority.21 
This Article will first define the problem of sexual harassment in schools. It will 
then examine how sexual harassment litigation in both the United States and Canada has 
evolved from each country’s respective civil and human rights laws. The Article will 
further examine how each system goes about administratively and judicially addressing 
complaints of sexual harassment in schools or other educational settings.  Finally, a 
comparison of the two systems will be made, and conclusions and recommendations 
drawn from those findings. 
II. THE UNITED STATES 
A. Sexual Harassment in U.S. Schools 
 Regrettably, most girls and young women suffer some form of sexual harassment 
while they are in school.22 In a study administered by the American Association of 
University Women, a survey of more than 1600 high school students found that roughly 
eighty percent had experienced some form of sexual harassment while in school.23 
Eighty-five percent of the girls responded that they had been targets of harassment in 
school.24 In addition, the vast majority of harassment reported was committed by other 
students.25 
While it is clear that many students report that they have suffered sexual 
harassment in schools, it is not clear that all parties involved characterize the harassment 
 
21 Drobac interview, supra note 19. 




7as problematic.26 Part of the sexual harassment problem in schools may be due to 
reluctance among some teachers and parents to view peer or student-to-student sexual 
harassment as a genuine problem; instead these parties argue that regulating “natural” 
young male behavior somehow diminishes a young boy’s freedom to experience his 
childhood.27 
In order to make any headway in solving the sexual harassment problem in 
schools, outdated attitudes, such as “boys will be boys” must be dispelled. 28 Sexual 
harassment in any setting and at any age level is inappropriate and harmful to its 
victims.29 The idea that this type of boys’ behavior is somehow natural and must be 
tolerated is illogical in considering other behavior that is not tolerated.30 Pamela Price, a 
pioneering attorney specializing in sexual harassment practice, stated as follows: 
The concern appears to be that if we intercede in the developing sexual 
identities of adolescents, or unduly interfere in their sexual behavior, we 
will somehow warp their notions of sexuality. This concern is writ large in 
discussions of the application of sexual harassment in education, but 
appears completely muted when discussing issues of teen pregnancy, date 
rape, and related problems, where the law interferes aggressively.31 
Tolerance of sexually harassing behavior on the part of boys also teaches girls 
that they are powerless to combat harassment, thereby contributing to the overall 
 
26 Rhode, supra note 1, at 292. 
27 Id. 
28 See id. at 292-93. “A school should not excuse the harassment with an attitude of ‘that’s just emerging 
adolescent sexuality’ or boys will be boys’…” Id. See also Pamela Price, Eradicating Sexual Harassment 
in Education, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 60 (Catherine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. 
Siegel eds., 2004). Price offers her own personal history of sexual harassment she experienced while an 
undergraduate at Yale, in addition to her thoughts on the development of sexual harassment law in the 
United States. Id. 
29 See, e.g., Office for Civil Rights, Sexual Harassment: It’s Not Academic, available at http: 
www.ed.gov/about/offices/list.ocr/docs/ocrshpam.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2005). This pamphlet released 
by Office for Civil Rights, a part of the U.S. Department of Education, serves as a policy guide for school 
administrators in the United States. Id. The pamphlet begins by stating that “[s]exual harassment can 
threaten a student’s physical or emotional well-being, influence how well a student does in school, and 
make it difficult for a student to achieve his or her career goals.” Id. 
30 Id. at 62.   
31 Id.  
8problem. 32 Deborah Rhode, a sexual harassment professor at Stanford, finds that 
“[p]arents and teachers either say that girls ‘ask for it’ or that ‘it’s just a testosterone 
thing,’ and girls should learn to ‘deal with it.’”33 Forcing girls to cope with harassment 
may cause them to think that they are somehow responsible for the behavior, further 
reinforcing gender subordination.34 Moreover, focus should particularly be placed on 
combating sexual harassment behaviors against children and adolescents, as they are 
more vulnerable to attack, and less likely to speak out about offenses because of their 
lack of experience and maturity.35 As stated by Price, “[w]hat better place to teach our 
children how to respect each other than in school?”36 
In short, sexual harassment is a serious problem that has yet to be fixed in today’s 
schools. Harmful ideas and attitudes that trivialize the harm sexual harassment causes to 
students further thwart any efforts made toward solving the problem.37 Even so, the 
United States has attempted to address the problem of sexual harassment in schools 
through legislation and case law.38 
32Rhode, supra note 1, at 292. Rhode states that an assumption exists that “victims are responsible either for 
provoking sexual abuse or for learning to cope with it.” Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 See American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, Policy Statement – Sexual Harassment (Oct. 
1992), at http://www.aacap.org/publications/policy/ps28.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2006). The American 
Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry observed in a policy statement that “[i]t is common for 
children and adolescents to conceal [sexual harassment] because they feel afraid, ashamed, vulnerable and 
humiliated. They may actually believe their own behavior may have precipitated the sexual harassment. 
These incidents are often not revealed for many years, if ever.” Id. Furthermore, even looked at from the 
child nurturance/protectionist camp or the child self-determinist camp, laws should be enforced that prevent 
sexual harassment in schools. Drobac interview, supra note 19. As self-determinists, children should be 
able to assert their rights under civil rights legislation that safeguards them, or protects them from sexual 
harassment. See FRANKLIN ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE (1982) for further 
discussion of the differences between child protectionists and the self-determinists.  
36 Id.
37 See generally Rhode, supra note 1. 
38 See discussion infra Part II.B-C. 
9B. The Development of Sexual Harassment Liability under Title IX 
 Before the United States attempted to tackle the problem of sexual harassment in 
schools, it first addressed the broader issue of educationally-based gender discrimination. 
In early 1970, female members of Congress began to push for legislation that would 
prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex in educational environments.39 The now 
famous Title IX was enacted shortly thereafter as part of the Educational Acts of 1972; it 
provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded 
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under 
any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . ”40 Sexual 
harassment in an educational environment is now considered discrimination on the basis 
of sex, and is therefore considered a violation of Title IX.41 
Sexual harassment was first recognized as discrimination on the basis of sex by a 
federal district court in a 1976 Title VII employment case.42 Shortly thereafter, in 1978 a 
federal court, relying on Title VII principles, found sexual harassment to be violative of 
Title IX.43 However, at this time a private cause of action was not recognized and the 
 
39 See generally Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704 (discussing the legislative history behind Title IX). The court 
quoted Representative Patsy Mink as stating “Any college or university which has [a] . . . policy which 
discriminates against women applicants . . . is free to do so under [Title IX] but such institutions should not 
be asking the taxpayers of this country to pay for this kind of discrimination. Millions of women pay taxes 
into the Federal treasury and we collectively resent that these funds should be used for the support of 
institutions to which we are denied equal access.” Id.
40 28 U.S.C. 1681(a) et seq. (1972). 
41 See generally Gebser, 524 U.S. 274. 
42 See Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.; Williams v. 
Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978).  
43 Alexander v. Yale, 459 F. Supp. 1 (D. Conn. 1977), aff'd, 631 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 
It is perfectly reasonable to maintain that academic achievement conditioned upon 
submission to sexual demands constitutes sex discrimination in education, just as 
questions of job retention or promotion tied to sexual demands from supervisors have 
become increasingly recognized as potential violations of Title VII’s ban against sex 
discrimination in employment. 
Id. at 4. 
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only remedy available was a termination of federal funds.44 Two years later, the United 
States Supreme Court recognized a right to pursue a private cause of action for a 
violation of Title IX.45 
In 1992 the U.S. Supreme Court definitively held that sexual harassment was 
indeed a violation of Title IX in the case of Franklin v. Gwinnett.46 In Franklin, the 
victim was a high school student who alleged that a male teacher at her school “subjected 
her to coercive intercourse,” in addition to other allegations.47 Ms. Franklin claimed that 
the school knew about the abuse and did nothing to stop it.48 Instead, school officials 
dissuaded her from pressing charges against the teacher.49 The Supreme Court applied 
Title VII standards in Franklin, finding that “when a supervisor sexually harasses a 
subordinate because of the subordinate’s sex, that supervisor ‘discriminates’ on the basis 
of sex.”50 “We believe the same rule should apply when a teacher sexually harasses and 
abuses a student.”51 The Court also ruled that compensatory money damages were 
available.52 
44 See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1977), rev'd by 441 U.S. 677 (1979). 
45 See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). 
46 503 U.S. 60 (1992). “Unquestionably, Title IX placed on the Gwinnett County Public Schools the duty 
not to discriminate on the basis of sex . . . .” Id. at 75. Six years before Franklin, the Supreme Court ruled 
in Meritor v. Vinson, 447 U.S. 57 (1986), that sexual harassment was discrimination on the basis of sex in 
the employment context under Title VII. While Title VII and Title IX both encompass prohibitions on 
sexual harassment, albeit it in different contexts, it is important to note that the case law for each statute has 
had its own separate evolution, and each have their own separate legal standards. For a general comparison 
of the two statutes and their differing sexual harassment legal standards, see C. Scott Williams, Schools, 
Peer Sexual Harassment, Title IX, and Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 51 BAYLOR L. REV.
1087 (1999); Justin P. Smith, Letting the Master Answer: Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment in the 
Workplace after Faragher and Burlington Industries. 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1786 (1999). 
47 Id. at 63. 
48 Id. at 63-64. 
49 Id.
50 Id. at 75 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 76. 
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 While a brief history of Title IX case law is helpful in ascertaining the procedural 
evolution of sexual harassment cases under that statute, the cases cited supra do not
present the present standard of liability under Title IX for sexual harassment cases. That 
standard was established by the Supreme Court in 1998 in the case of Gebser v. Lago 
Independent School District.53 
C. Current Title IX Sexual Harassment Law 
 1. Gebser v. Lago 
In Gebser v. Lago Independent School District, the Supreme Court set the current 
legal standard for recovery under Title IX sexual harassment cases.54 Gebser, a high-
school-aged girl, was involved in a long-term sexual relationship with a teacher, 
Waldrop, over the course of her freshman and sophomore years.55 Waldrop initially made 
sexually-related comments to the victim while she was in eighth grade and participated in 
a book discussion club that he led at the local high school.56 During the next year, 
Waldrop escalated his sexual contact with the victim until they were frequently engaging 
in sexual intercourse during class time.57 The relationship ended when a police officer 
discovered them having sex and arrested Waldrop.58 
Gebser never reported the relationship to school officials, “testifying that while 
she realized Waldrop’s conduct was improper, she was uncertain how to react and she 
wanted to continue to have him as a teacher.”59 Parents of two other students did inform 
 
53 524 U.S. 274 (1998). 
54 524 U.S. 274 (1998). 






the school principal of Waldrop’s sexually-related related comments in class.60 The 
principal then held a meeting with Waldrop and the parents in which Waldrop was told to 
be careful about the comments he made in the future.61 A guidance counselor was also 
advised about Waldrop’s class comments. No other action was taken regarding Waldrop 
until his employment was terminated following his arrest.62 
Gebser and her mother filed suit against the school district and Waldrop under 
Title IX and § 1983, in addition to other state law claims, seeking compensatory and 
punitive damages from both defendants.63 The Title IX claim was dismissed against the 
school district because the district court reasoned that “evidence was inadequate to raise a 
genuine issue on whether the school district had actual or constructive notice that 
Waldrop was involved in a sexual relationship with a student.”64 The Fifth Circuit 
affirmed on similar grounds.65 
The Gebser Court affirmed the lower court decision in finding that in order to 
recover for sexual harassment suffered in school, the victim must show that a person in a 
position of authority with the ability to take corrective action had actual knowledge of the 
discrimination and was recklessly indifferent to that discrimination.66 By far the highest 
hurdle to overcome under the Gebser standard is establishing that the person in the 




63 Id. at 278-79. 
64 Id.
65 Id. at 280. 
66 Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290 (emphasis added). 
67 For instance, under the Title VII workplace cases of Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 
(1998), and Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998), employers are held to strictly liable or 
negligence standards for actions of sexual harassment committed by their employees. See Smith, supra note 
46. School administrators, on the other hand, have to actually know about actions of sexual harassment 
13
 The majority opinion gave a detailed account of the legislative history and 
congressional intent behind Title IX, upon which Justice O’Connor relied heavily in 
framing her opinion regarding the notice standard.68 O’Connor, writing for a five-to-four 
majority, stated that Congress had “two principle objectives in mind: ‘[t]o avoid the use 
of federal resources to support discriminatory practices’ and ‘to provide individual 
citizens effective protection against those practices.’”69 The Court noted that the statute 
was modeled after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits race 
discrimination in all programs receiving federal funding.70 The two statutes operate in 
essentially the same manner, conditioning an offer of federal funding on a promise by the 
recipient not to discriminate.71 In effect, the majority found that the statutes operate as a 
contract between the government and the recipient of funding.72 
Justice O’Connor then distinguished Title VII from Title IX, finding that Title VII 
is framed in terms of “outright prohibition” not “condition.” 73 She continued, stating that  
Title VII applies to all employers without regard to federal funding and 
aims broadly to ‘eradicat[e] discrimination throughout the economy.’ Title 
VII, moreover, seeks to make persons whole for injuries suffered through 
past discrimination. Thus, whereas Title VII aims centrally to compensate 
victims of discrimination, Title IX focuses more on ‘protecting’ 
individuals from discriminatory practices carried out by recipients of 
federal funds.74 
committed by school employees for liability to attach under Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290. A possible reason for 
the differing standards might be that private companies and school districts are two fundamentally different 
types of financial organizations to hold liable. Drobac interview, supra note 19. 
68 Gebser, 524 U.S. at 286. 
69 Id.
70 Id; see also 42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq (1964). Title VI provides in pertinent part: “No person in the United 
States shall, on the grounds of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activities receiving Federal financial 
assistance.” Id.
71 Gebser, 524 U.S. at 286. 
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. See also supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
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O’Connor used these differences in the legislative history, Congressional intent, and 
statutory framework between Title VII and Title IX to establish the legal standard for 
recovery for sexual harassment under Title IX, in particular the amount of notice required 
on the part of schools officials to trigger liability.75 
O’Connor argued that Congress did not intend for constructive notice to trigger 
liability under Title IX because of the statute’s contractual framework.76 O’Connor 
essentially found that it is reasonable to assume that Congress did not intend for liability 
to attach in monetary damages for the noncompliance with a condition.77 Furthermore, 
she found that the statute’s construction of allowing agency enforcement also does not 
envision liability under constructive notice or respondeat superior when the agency 
cannot initiate enforcement proceedings until it has given notice to recipients of funding 
that they are not in compliance.78 Thus, under this analysis, Justice O’Connor, in order to 
avoid “frustrating the purposes” of Title IX, distinguished the notice standard for 
recovery under Title IX from that under Title VII, where violations are either categorized 
under a strict liability or negligence standard, based upon the status of the harasser.79 
Justice Stevens, however, writing for the dissent, found that the majority’s 
opinion is not faithful to the class of people Title IX intended to protect.80 In particular, 
Stevens noted that the majority veered from settled principles of agency in distinguishing 
between recovery under Title VII and Title IX.81 Stevens observed this differentiation 
negatively, finding that any slight difference in the statutory language is due to the 
 
75 Id.
76 Id. at 287. 
77 Id.
78 Id. at 288. 
79 See supra note 67. Again, different notice standards have been established by the courts for harassment 
that occurs in the workplace as opposed to a school or other educational environment. Id.
80 Gebser, 524 U.S. at 306. 
81 Id. at 306 n. 9.  
15
difference between a workplace and a school, not in a Congressional intent to afford less 
protection to victims under Title IX.82 Stevens further found that the majority, in 
mistakenly focusing on the statute’s framework and administrative enforcement scheme, 
is “[a]s a matter of policy . . . rank[ing] the protection of the school district’s purse above 
the protection of immature high school students that [Title IX’s] rules would provide.”83 
In short, the dissent concluded that “few Title IX plaintiffs who have been victims of 
intentional discrimination will be able to recover damages under this exceedingly high 
standard.”84 
Thus, as stated, under Gebser, the majority Court held that “a damages remedy 
will not lie under Title IX unless an official who at a minimum has authority to address 
the alleged discrimination and to institute corrective measures on the recipient’s behalf 
has actual knowledge of discrimination in the recipient’s programs and fails adequately to 
respond.”85 The Court offered guidance in interpreting the “fails to respond” or “reckless 
indifference” portion of the standard by likening it to the deliberate indifference standard 
under § 1983 claims.86 The Court did not, however, elaborate appreciably on what 
constitutes actual knowledge of discrimination.87 At present, lower court decisions are 
 
82 Id.
83 Id. at 306. 
84 Id. at 304. 
85 Id. at 290. 
86 Id. Under § 1983 claims, “deliberate indifference” essentially “requires proof of a clearly apparent need 
for action and a woefully inadequate response, such that one can reasonably assume that the decision 
makers were deliberately indifferent to the need.” Williams, supra note 46, at 1103. See City of Canton v. 
Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), for the Court’s development of the deliberate indifference standard for § 1983 
cases. In Doe v. University of Illinois Judge Posner expounded on the meaning of deliberate indifference in 
the Title IX context, stating that in a situation in which the “school knows about the harassment, knows that 
it is serious or even dangerous, and could take effective measures at low cost to avert the danger, but 
decides, consciously and deliberately, to do nothing, although it does not base this decision on an invidious 
ground such as race or sex.” 138 F.3d 653, 680 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner, C.J., dissenting). 
87 Perhaps because it was evident that petitioners in this case conceded that they could not recover under an 
actual notice standard, the Court did not find it necessary to further define what would specifically 
constitute actual notice. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 291. 
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offering different answers to that question.88 Some districts have established a strict 
construction of the actual notice standard under Gebser that finds that a “substantial risk” 
of abuse does not constitute notice.89 Other districts have found that direct complaints by 
third parties or numerous rumors are enough to generate notice.90 Lastly, who constitutes 
an “appropriate person” that can end the discrimination, is generally determined to be, if 
not at least a principal, then a school board member or school superintendent.91 
2. Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education 
 The legal standard for recovery for sexual harassment under Title IX was 
reiterated in the Supreme Court case of Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education,92 
decided one year after Gebser.93 Perhaps more importantly, Davis established that under 
Gebser a victim of peer, or student-on-student, sexual harassment at school may bring an 
action under Title IX.94 
In Davis, a young girl in the fifth grade was allegedly the victim of a prolonged 
pattern of harassment by one of her fifth grade classmates.95 According to the victim’s 
mother, the harasser’s conduct included attempts to touch LaShonda’s breasts and genital 
area and vulgar statements such as “I want to get in bed with you” and “I want to feel 
 
88 See Delgado v. Stegall, 367 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2004); Bayard v. Malone, 268 F.3d 228, 237 (4th Cir. 
2001); P.H. v. The Sch. Dist. of Kansas City, 265 F.3d 653, 663 (8th Cir. 2001); but see Johnson v. Galen 
Health Insitutes, Inc., 267 F.Supp. 2d 679, 688 (W.D. Ky. 2003); Hart v. Paint Valley School Dist., No. C2-
01-004, 2002 WL 31951264 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 15, 2002); Doe v. School Admin. Dist. No. 19, 66 F. Supp. 
2d 57, 63 (D. Me. 1999). 
89 See, e.g., Bayard, 268 F.3d at 237-38. 
90 See, e.g., Doe, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 63 (finding that actual notice “requires more that a simple report of 
inappropriate conduct” on the part of a school employee but “the … standard does not set the bar so high 
that a school district is not put on notice until it receives a clearly credible report from the plaintiff-
student.”). See also Johnson, 267 F.Supp. 2d 679, 688; Hart, No. C2-01-004, 2002 WL 31951264.  
91 See infra note 128 and accompanying text. 
92 526 U.S. 629 (1999). 
93 524 U.S. 274 (1998). 
94 Id. at 633. 
95 Id.
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your boobs.”96 The harasser also allegedly touched LaShonda in a suggestive manner in 
the hallway, and directed sexually harassing behavior towards her several times while 
they were together in gym class.97 Each of the incidents was reported to the girl’s teacher, 
who assured the mother that the principal of the school was also notified.98 According to 
the mother, her daughter’s once high grades fell as a result of the harassment; the victim’s 
father also discovered that she had written a suicide note during the period that his 
daughter was being harassed.99 
The petitioner brought suit against the Monroe County Board of Education 
seeking monetary damages and injunctive relief under Title IX after no disciplinary 
action was taken against the harasser.100 At both the district court and appellate court 
levels the case was dismissed on the ground that peer, or student-on-student, sexual 
harassment provides no ground for a private cause of action under Title IX.101 
Justice O’Connor, again writing for the majority of the Court, found that an action 
for peer sexual harassment may be brought under Title IX, but “only for harassment that 
is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively bars the victim’s 
access to an educational opportunity or benefit.”102 O’Connor found that the harassment 
suffered by the daughter was actionable, even though it was not committed by a school 
official, because it created an environment that denied her equal access to education 
 
96 Id.
97 Id. at 633-34. 
98 Id.
99 Id. at 634. 
100 Id. at 635-636. 
101 Id. at 636. 
102 Id. at 633. 
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opportunities, as shown by the victim’s decreasing grades, and was not remedied by 
school officials that knew about the harm.103 
The decision in Davis was also five-to-four majority, with Justice Kennedy (who 
was part of the majority in Gebser) writing the dissent.104 Kennedy attacked O’Connor’s 
opinion on several fronts.105 Notably, Kennedy found that much needed funding for 
schools will be diverted into compensatory damage payments to victims of peer sexual 
harassment under Title IX, thus resulting in schools implementing a federally mandated 
code of conduct, contrary to the principles of federalism.106 But perhaps more 
shockingly, Kennedy further suggested that behavior actionable by the majority under 
Davis is perhaps difficult to even define as sexual harassment.107 Kennedy stated that 
“[n]o one contests that much of this ‘dizzying array of immature or uncontrollable 
behaviors by students,’ is inappropriate, even ‘objectionably offensive’ at times . . . It is a 
far different question, however, whether it is either proper or useful to label this 
immature, childish behavior gender discrimination.”108 In essence, the dissent found that 
Davis will result in a floodgate of student-on-student sexual harassment litigation, and a 
school’s only choice in dealing with that outcome would be to implement codes of 
conduct that have no chance in altering normal, immature, childish behaviors, that have 
been wrongfully characterized as “sexual harassment.”109 
103 Id. at 652 (emphasis added). 
104 Davis, 526 U.S. at 654. Interestingly, or perhaps tellingly, the majority and dissents in Gebser and Davis 
are reversed with O’Connor the only justice to remain on the majority side. Id.; Gebser, 524 U.S. at 274.  
105 Davis, 526 U.S. at 654-86. 
106 Id. at 657-658. But how would a judicially-enforced federal code of conduct here be substantially 
different in principle from the code of conduct imposed upon the states by Brown v. Board of Education?
107 Id. at 673. 
108 Id.
109 Id. at 686. 
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 O’Connor rebutted much of Kennedy’s criticism by emphasizing that liability can 
only attach for unreasonable indifference to harassment in light of the known 
circumstances.110 She also pointed out that schools, and school officials, by their very 
nature have some authority over the behavior of children in their programs.111 O’Connor 
writes: “the nature of [the State’s] power [over public schoolchildren] is custodial and 
tutelary, permitting a degree of supervision and control that could not be exercised over 
free adults.”112 
While the dissent in Gebser initially presented many of the criticisms of the 
Court’s interpretation of Title IX, many legal observers and scholars went on to further 
suggest that the Court’s opinions in both Gebser and Davis do little to protect students 
from sexual harassment, particularly from their peers.113 Furthermore, even as Kennedy 
argued that the majority’s opinion in Davis will open the floodgates of litigation; the 
converse result appears more likely as the strenuous legal standards for recovery under 
Title IX for sexual harassment present a high barrier for recovery to potential plaintiffs.114 
3. Criticism of the Law in the United States: 
 The bottom-line criticism of the Title IX sexual harassment standard under 
Gebser is that it is crafted in such as way as to fail to both effectively remedy past harm 
 
110 Id. at 648-649. Some, however, find that O’Connor’s characterization of the indifference standard in 
terms of reasonableness in peer sexual harassment cases only further muddies that element of the analysis. 
See Julie Davies, Assessing Institutional Responsibility for Sexual Harassment in Education, 77 TULANE L. 
REV. 387, 427-428 (2002). Professor Davies notes that lower courts analyze the requirement differently; 
she argues that requiring a conscious decision not to address complaints of harassment in order to meet that 
element is a mistake. Id. Davis finds that the factual situations and circumstances surrounding sexual 
harassment in schools call for a wider definition of indifference than a conscious decision to ignore the 
harassment. Id. 
111 Davis, 526 U.S. at 646. 
112 Id.
113 See discussion infra Part II.C.3.  
114 See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 306 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Davis, 526 U.S. at 654 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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and prevent future harm.115 Sexual harassment professor Deborah Rhode found that the 
Gebser decision was simply a “step in the wrong direction.”116 Rhode noted that under 
the employment cases of Faragher117 and Burlington Industries,118 an employer can be 
held liable for a supervisor’s conduct, even if the employer did not have direct knowledge 
of the conduct in question.119 Under Gebser, however, she found that adult school 
employees, such as teachers and janitors, have more protection from sexual harassment 
than students have.120 
Rhode also noted that the decision in Gebser not only fails to promote adequate 
harassment policies, it actually encourages schools to turn a blind eye to harassment.121 
As Rhode states, “[w]hen ignorance is bliss, and a defense to legal judgments, why 
should schools establish effective complaint strategies? The less the school knows, the 
less its risk of liability.” 122 While Rhode acknowledged that O’Connor did not wish to 
press the decision any further because of the agency enforcement scheme of Title IX, 
Rhode observed that ignorance as a legal strategy could hardly have been the outcome 
desired by the Gebser majority.123 
In discussing Davis, Rhode found that at least the Supreme Court did better than 
some lower court decisions that denied that individual recovery was even allowed under 
Title IX for peer sexual harassment.124 Like Gebser, however, Davis still creates 
 
115 See generally Rhode, supra note 1. 
116 Id. at 297. 
117 524 U.S. 775. 
118 524 U.S. 742. 




123 Id. at 298. 
124 Id. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 538, for a description of the circuits splits in the lower courts regarding 
liability under Title IX for peer sexual harassment.  
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incentives for school districts to avoid knowledge of sexual harassment that might subject 
them to liability under Title IX.125 Rhode further noted that the current system is made 
even more problematic by relying on students to come forward to administrators about 
sexual harassment they may have suffered.126 Students are far too reluctant to readily 
complain to anyone about something so sensitive, especially something that could lead to 
embarrassment and humiliation by other students.127 Lower court rulings have 
compounded this difficulty by requiring students to give notice to a school board member 
or a senior supervisor with authority to ensure Title IX compliance, instead of a teacher 
with whom they may be more comfortable and open.128 Rhode concluded by advocating 
a system more like that found in employment law, and also advocated by Justice 
Ginsburg in her dissent in Gebser, where school administrators and officials could be 
held liable under Title IX, even if they lack specific knowledge, unless the school had an 
effective grievance policy in place to report and redress sexual harassment complaints.129 
Pamela Price found similar problems with Title IX sexual harassment 
jurisprudence.130 Price summed up her experience as follows: 
What I have found in my law practice and in …teaching is that many 





128 Id. See, e.g., Floyd v. Walters, 171 F.3d 1264, 1265 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding under remand from the 
Supreme Court that the two defendants who were given notice of sexual misconduct in the case were not 
school officials with authority to “end the discrimination”, and therefore could not be considered 
appropriate persons under Gebser); Canutilla Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Leija, 101 F.3d 393, 401 (5th Cir. 1996) 
(finding under Title IX, pre-Gebser, that an appropriate person for purposes of notice would be someone in 
a “management-level position”) The court did not expound on the question of “whether the appropriate (or 
lowest level) management-level person to be notified is a Title IX coordinator, vice-principal, principal, 
superintendent, or school board member.” Id.
129 Id. Justice Ginsburg, writing a concurrence with the dissent in Gebser, addresses the issue of affirmative 
defenses in Title IX actions, finding that if a school district may avoid Title IX liability if it can 
demonstrate that it properly, under the Department of Education Guidelines, established an effective 
grievance and reporting policy. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 304.  
130 Price, supra note 28, at 61.  
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procedures, and some don’t even know what Title IX is. With so little 
knowledge, and no experience in enforcing the law, it is still 1977 in most 
parts of America.131 
4. Where are all the cases? 
The negative treatment of the Gebser standard by legal scholars in its ability to 
exact change in the system is further supported by the dearth of Title IX sexual 
harassment suits, settlements or verdicts, post-Gebser.132 Anecdotally, a plaintiff’s 
attorney who won a rare verdict for a student sexual harassment victim was quoted in the 
Detroit Free News as stating, “Most of the cases never make it to the jury because of the 
deliberate indifference standard . . . You have to show . . . the district should have known 
the students’ rights are being violated and they did nothing or had a policy of doing 
nothing.”133 Moreover, a LexisNexis search revealed only sixty three Title IX sexual 
harassment cases after June 22, 1998, the date Gebser was decided.134 Of those cases, 
thirty-five were disposed of on either summary judgment or dismissal in favor of the 
defendant(s).135 Seventeen of those dismissals or summary judgments were based on a 
 
131 Id.
132 For example, a simple search of jury verdicts on the free verdict database website www.morelaw.com 
revealed only two verdicts and one settlement for cases of sexual harassment under Title IX between 1996 
and 2005 (search performed January 31, 2006) [hereinafter Morelaw.com search].  
133 Marisa Schultz, Transfer Didn't Stop Warren Molester; The Decision Cost the School District $2.1 
Million, a Rare Win in a Sexual Abuse Case, THE DETROIT NEWS, Apr. 24, 2005. Schultz also wrote that 
this verdict was:  
the largest against any school district in a federal lawsuit alleging teacher sexual 
misconduct, according to sample data going back to 1985 by Jury Verdict Research, a 
Horsham, Pa.-based firm that tracks and analyzes personal injury litigation. The 
organization's database has more than 245,000 verdicts and settlements. Suing a district 
directly has been successful only in a number of educator abuse cases nationwide. The 
research firm has tracked 18 similar cases in the last two decades. 
Id. 
134 524 U.S. 274 (1998). A search was performed in LexisNexis on February 1, 2006  using the search 
phrase (“Title IX” and “sexual harassment” and “Gebser” and “actual notice” and CORE-TERMS (sexual 
harassment)) yielded a total of sixty-three cases. On the same day a search performed using the search 
phrase (CORE-TERMS (sexual harassment) and CORE-TERMS (hostile work environment) and Title VII) 
yielded 1597 cases [hereinafter LexisNexis search]. 
135 Id.
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lack of actual notice under Gebser.136 The majority of the other dismissals were based on 
either a failure to meet the Davis peer sexual harassment hostile environment standard 
(nine) or a failure to meet the deliberate indifference standard (seven).137 Two verdicts for 
the defense were upheld on appeal138 while only one verdict for the plaintiffs was 
affirmed.139 Conversely, an analogous search for Title VII hostile work environment 
sexual harassment cases within the same time period yielded 1597 results.140 
Another reason plaintiffs may fail to bring cases is the ambiguous legal standard 
for equitable relief versus damages under Title IX in sexual harassment cases.141 When 
the Court established the actual notice standard for Gebser, it only referred to 
compensatory damages in crafting its standard.142 However, the Court never delineated 
whether the actual notice standard applied to equitable relief as well as compensatory 
damages.143 Thus, even now, though equitable relief is available under Title IX, it has not 
firmly been established whether the legal standard for such relief is actual notice, or some 
lower standard.144 The situation is made more unclear by the assertion of the Office of 
Civil Rights (OCR), the administrative body charged with implementing and enforcing 
Title IX, that:  
While recognizing the requirement of actual notice for private actions 




138 Pociute v. W. Chester Univ., 117 Fed. Appx. 832 (3rd Cir. 2004); Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. Sch. 
Dist., 163 F.3d 749 (2nd Cir. 1998). 
139 Vance v. Spencer County Pub. Sch. Dist., 231 F.3d 253 (6th Cir. 2000). 
140 See LexisNexis search, supra note 134. 
141 The Supreme Court first decided in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), that a 
plaintiff has a private right of action under Title IX; the Court then decided in Frankin v. Gwinnett Cty. 
Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60 (1992), that Title IX also recognizes a damages remedy. See discussion supra Part 
II.B. See infra Part II.C.4 for explanation of the ambiguity of the legal standards. 
142 See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 283-84.  
143 Id.
144 See Frederick v. Simpson College, 160 F. Supp. 2d 1033 (Dist. Ct. S. Iowa 2001) (discussing the 
murkiness of the standard for equitable relief under Title IX sexual harassment claims). 
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purposes and for private actions for injunctive and other equitable relief, a 
school has notice if a responsible employee knew, or in the exercise of 
care should have known of the harassment.145 
Thus, even if a plaintiff were only seeking injunctive relief, such as implementation of a 
sexual harassment policy or training and grievance procedures, the ambiguity created by 
Gebser, and the subsequent failure of the Supreme Court to clarify its standard in relation 
to the OCR could effectively deter a plaintiff from bringing a case at all.146 
Thus, while a (rare) verdict can make an individual plaintiff whole, the present 
system does little to effectuate the purposes of Title IX.147 Because plaintiffs are deterred 
from bringing any sort of suit, in damages or for equitable relief, schools districts are not 
consequently compelled to be compliant with Title IX policies.148 Furthermore, the 
Court’s high standard for damages recovery in Gebser suggests a concern on the part of 
the court that high damage awards could strip precious funds from school districts’ other 
needy students.149 Therefore, as more focus shifts to preventing financial loss on the part 
of school districts, less focus is invested in the most efficient manner of implementing 
prevention strategies and stopping harassment.150 
145 Office of Civil Rights, Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, 
Other Students, or Third Parties (1997, revised 2001) available at http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/ 
docs/shguide.html#Guidance (January 31, 2006) (The Guidance).  
146 I thank Professor Jennifer Drobac for helping me to clarify this point. See also Frederick, 160 F. Supp. 
2d 1033. 
147 See generally Gebser, 524 U.S. at 306 (Stevens, J. dissenting); Rhode, supra note 1. 
148 See Rhode, supra note 1. 
149 Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Davis suggested that extending the actual notice standard to peer sexual 
harassment cases was a step too far; he predicted a flood of cases that would empty school districts’ bank 
accounts. Davis, 526 U.S. at 654 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
150 See Rhode, supra note 1. 
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D. Administrative Enforcement of Title IX in the United States 
 The United States Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights (OCR) is 
charged with the responsibility of Title IX administration and enforcement.151 The OCR 
informs school districts of their obligation under Title IX to: have a sexual harassment 
policy, inform students and staff of that policy, and have published grievance procedures 
in the event that the policy is violated.152 The OCR’s publication, The Guidance, gives 
examples of what constitutes quid pro quo sexual harassment and hostile environment 
sexual harassment.153 The OCR also released a pamphlet entitled Sexual Harassment: It’s 
not Academic, which explains schools’ obligations under Title IX in a format easier for 
students, parents and teachers to understand.154 The pamphlet does refute the notion that 
“boys will be boys,” stating: 
 A school should not excuse the harassment with an attitude of ‘that’s just 
emerging adolescent sexuality’ or ‘boys will be boys,’ or ignore it for fear 
of damaging a professor’s reputation. This does nothing to stop the sexual 
harassment and can even send a message that such conduct is accepted or 
tolerated by the school. When a school makes it clear that sexual 
harassment will not be tolerated, trains it staff, and appropriately responds 
when harassment occurs, students will see the school as a safe place where 
everyone can learn.155 
The pamphlet also notes that sexual harassment prevention is important at all educational 
levels.156 
151 Office of Civil Rights, Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, 
Other Students, or Third Parties (1997, revised 2001), available at 
http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/shguide.html (Jan. 31, 2006) [hereinafter The Guidance].  
152 Id.
153 Id. An example of quid pro quo sexual harassment in an educational environment would be a teacher or 
professor asking for sexual favors in exchange for a higher grade. Id.
154 Office of Civil Rights, Sexual Harassment: It’s not Academic (1997), available at 




 The OCR’s website provides information about how to file a complaint: the 
complaint must be made in writing (online is acceptable), contain a description of the 
charges, and be filed within 180 days of the alleged discrimination.157 The OCR will then 
investigate properly filed complaints; complaints that contain sufficient evidence of 
noncompliance will generally result in an agreement of compliance between the OCR and 
the school.158 If a school fails to come into compliance after an agreement was made with 
the OCR, and future agreements are also to no avail, the agency may proceed with 
administrative enforcement procedures.159 These include either termination of funding or 
referral to the department of justice for judicial enforcement.160 
In the OCR’s yearly Report to Congress, it publishes a limited number of 
statistics, including the number of complaints, or “receipts,” the agency received during 
that year.161 The 2004 Report noted that the agency received 283 sex-based complaints, 
of which sexual harassment is included, which accounted for six percent of the total 
complaints received.162 The vast majority of complaints, fifty-two percent, were 
disability-based.163 These numbers suggest a vast disparity in the reported amount of 
harassment occurring in schools and the amount of harassment complaints received. 
While it is true that reported incidents of harassment could be resolved by school or state 
agencies, thus negating the need for OCR regulation, at least one study suggests that the 
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161 Office for Civil Rights, Annual Report to Congress FY 2004, available at http://www.ed.gov/about/ 




OCR is doing a poor job of rooting out harassment in schools.164 The study notes that the 
OCR’s statute of limitations on complaints is six months; a much shorter time than 
complainants have when filing in state or district court.165 Moreover, lack of knowledge 
of Title IX or OCR regulations is not grounds for an extension in filing time.166 Second, 
while the OCR has power to refer cases to the Department of Justice for judicial 
enforcement, a Title IX case has never been referred.167 Poor enforcement by the OCR is 
particularly tragic because the Supreme Court has stressed the importance of 
administrative remedies to allow a school to come into compliance before it will impose a 
last-resort remedy like fund termination.168 
Unlike the OCR, the Equal Opportunity in Employment Commission (EEOC), the 
administrative body that is charged with enforcing Title VII in the workplace,169 seems to 
enjoy relative success compared to the OCR in achieving its goals.170 While the OCR has 
only referred two cases to the Department of Justice for judicial enforcement, the EEOC 
 
164 License for Bias, supra note 11. 
165 Id. There is no statute of limitations provided under Title IX. See, e.g., Curto v. Edmundson, 392 F.3d 
502, 504 (2nd Cir. 2004) “Title IX does not contain a statute of limitations. Accordingly, for claims such as 
these to which the four-year federal catch-all statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a) is inapplicable, 
see Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369 (2004), we must apply ‘the most appropriate or 
analogous state statute of limitations,’ Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 660 (1987).” Id. The 
court notes that the circuits have generally used state personal injury statutes of limitation for Title IX 
claims. Id.
166 See License for Bias, supra note 11, at 52. 
167 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Office of Civil Rights Evaluation, Draft Report for Commissioners’ 
Review, Ten-Year Checkup: Have Federal Agencies Responded to Civil Rights Recommendations? Vol. IV 
(May 2004) at 31, available at http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/10yr04/10yr04.pdf.
168 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 705 n.38. 
169 See EEOC website, at http://www.eeoc.gov (last visited Feb.2, 2005).  
170 For example, the EEOC, in association with state agencies, was able to resolve 13,786 charges (the 
EEOC’s terminology for complaint), and obtain 1646 settlements in Title VII sexual harassment 
enforcement proceedings. See Sexual Harassment Charges EEOC & FEPAs Combined: FY 1992 - FY 
2004, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/harass.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2006). The OCR, on the other 
hand, only received a total of 5044 complaint receipts, 283 of which were sex-based. See Office for Civil 
Rights, Annual Report to Congress FY 2004, supra note 161. 
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has the power to file suit, and in 2004 filed 280 Title VII suits in court.171 Perhaps this 
disparity is due to the relative priorities of the political parties in office, or simply the 
greater perceived importance of eliminating sexual harassment in the workplace.172 
Because sexual harassment case law has effectively neutralized the promise of 
Title IX, “the victims whom it was intended to protect are being victimized a second time 
by the judicial system.”173 Likewise, the poor performance of the OCR in actually 
enforcing and implementing Title IX in U.S. schools has further eroded the promise of 
discrimination-free learning environments.174 For these reasons, the United States should 
look to the Canadian model of civil rights legislation and enforcement for ideas about 
how to improve domestic judicial and administrative enforcement of Title IX.  
III. CANADA 
A. The Problem in Canada 
Culturally speaking, Canada is very similar to the United States, and, not 
surprisingly, also suffers from a high rate of sexual harassment in its schools.175 For 
example, in a study conducted in Ontario secondary schools, a reported eighty percent of 
female students had been sexually harassed.176 However, Canada’s system of human 
 
171 See EEOC, EEOC Litigation Statistics, FY 1992 through FY 2004, available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/ litigation.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2006).  
172 This disparity seems embodied in the simple fact that almost everyone has heard of the EEOC, and 
almost no one has heard of the OCR. Drobac Interview, supra note 19. The relative ease in locating the 
EEOC website probably also helps it more easily disseminate information: it is located at simply 
www.eeoc.gov. In order to find the OCR website, one must wade through three Department of Education 
webpages. See www.ed.gov. Even if one finds the OCR website, its format is much more difficult to read 
and navigate than the format found at the EEOC site. See www.eeoc.gov and 
http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/index.html.  
173 Price, supra note 28, at 63. 
174 See License for Bias, supra note 11. 
175 Toronto, Ontario Secondary School Teacher’s Federation, The Joke’s Over – Student to Student Sexual 
Harassment in Secondary Schools (1995) at 3.   
176 Id.
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rights legislation for resolving anti-discrimination violations, such as sexual harassment, 
operates differently than the civil rights legislation system in place in the United States.177 
B. The Operation of Human Rights Legislation in Canada 
In Canada, sexual harassment is considered discrimination on the basis of sex 
under human rights legislation passed by the Canadian parliament in 1977.178 The 
resulting Canadian Human Rights Act (HRA) has as its purpose: “that people should not 
be placed at a disadvantage simply because of their age, sex, race, or any other ground 
covered by the Act.”179 The legislation was passed “to ensure equality of opportunity and 
freedom from discrimination in federal jurisdiction.”180 
Canadian human rights legislation functions differently than civil rights 
legislation in the United States. For example, in the Unites States, a workplace sexual 
harassment claim, whether it arises in the public (local, state or federal) or private sector, 
may be brought under the federal Title VII cause of action.181 In Canada, however, 
human rights legislation operates at both the federal and provincial level; each having 
separate jurisdiction over the cases that arise therefrom.182 The Canadian HRA only 
applies to individuals working for either the Federal Government or a private company 
regulated by the Federal Government.183 It also applies to anyone who receives goods and 
 
177 See infra Part III.B for a discussion of Canadian human rights system.
178 See Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S. 1985, c. H-6, available at 
http://chrccdp.ca/about/human_rights_act-en.asp (last visited Oct. 11, 2005) [hereinafter Commission 
website]. Under the HRA, the Canadian Human Rights Commission “accepts harassment complaints based 
on 11 grounds: race, colour, national or ethnic origin, age, religion, sex, marital status, family status, mental 
or physical disability, pardoned conviction, and sexual orientation.” Id. (emphasis added). 
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 See, e.g., Meritor, 447 U.S. at 57, where the plaintiff sued her private employer under Title VII. 
182 United Nations Association in Canada, Canada and Human Rights Website, at 
http://unac.org/rights/actguide/ canada.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2005). 
183 Id. See Commission website, supra note 178, for a detailed list of entities governed by the federal HRA. 
Thus, cases against schools would fall under the jurisdiction of provincial human rights laws. Id.
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services from any of those sectors.184 Similarly, each province has its own human rights 
law, usually called a Code or an Act (or in Quebec, a Charter), that covers other types of 
organizations not included under federal legislation.185 For instance, schools, retail stores, 
restaurants, and most factories are covered by provincial human rights law, as are 
provincial governments themselves.186 
Unlike the broadly differing views in the United States regarding the proper 
Congressional intent and interpretation of American civil rights legislation,187 Canadian 
judicial decisions have firmly established a broad interpretation of human rights 
legislation.188 The reasoning behind this broad application may lie in the constitutional or 
quasi constitutional nature of the legislation; for example, in the case of Ontario Human 
Rights Commission and O’Malley v. Simpson-Sears Ltd.,189 Justice McIntyre of the 
Canadian Supreme Court stated:  
 It is not, in my view, a sound approach to say that according to 
established rules of construction no broader meaning can be given to the 
Code that the narrowest interpretation of the words employed. The 
accepted rules of construction are flexible enough to enable the Court to 
recognize in the construction of a human rights code the special nature and 
purposes of the enactment, . . . and to give it an interpretation which will 
advance it’s broad purposes. Legislation of this type is of a special nature, 
 
184 See Canada and Human Rights Website, supra note 182.   
185 Id. See, e.g., Ontario Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19. Each province, in addition to the 
federal Canadian government, also operates a website that, in general, explains in laypersons terms the 
individual Human Rights Codes, the rights governed by them, and how to lodge an individual complaint if 
rights have been violated. See, e.g., The Ontario Human Rights Commission website, at 
http://www.ohrc.on.ca/english/code/index.shtml (last visited Feb. 3, 2006). 
186 See Canada and Human Rights Website, supra note 182.  
187 For differing views on the construction of protections offered under civil rights law (specifically Title 
IX) in the United States, one only need look to the majority and dissent decisions in Gebser, 524 U.S. 274 
or Davis, 526 U.S. 629. 
188 See, e.g., Beverley McLachlin, Introduction to the 1999 Legal Report, at the Commission website, supra 
note 178. Ms. McLachlin is the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada. 
189 [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536, 546-47. 
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not quite constitutional but certainly more than the ordinary – and it is for 
the courts to seek out its purpose and give it effect.190 
C. Canadian Administrative and Judicial Enforcement of Human Rights Legislation: 
When federal and provincial Canadian human rights legislation was created, 
special administrative commissions were also created at both the federal and provincials 
levels to administer and enforce the Acts.191 These human rights commissions bridge the 
gap between constitutional human rights theory192 and application by establishing 
practical steps and legal channels for solving human rights violations.193 The Canadian 
Human Rights Commission (HRC) administers the federal HRA.194 The HRC is the 
Canadian equivalent of the various federal United States’ civil rights agencies, such as 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and Office of Civil Rights.195 Each 
province also has its own corresponding commission to administer that province’s human 
rights code.196 As stated by the federal Canadian HRC:  
The Commission administers the Canadian HRA…and ensures that the 
principles of equal opportunity and non-discrimination are followed in all 
areas of federal jurisdiction. This includes…helping parties to resolve 
complaints of discrimination in employment, investigating complaints of 
discrimination, developing and conducting information programs to 
promote public understanding of the Act and the role and activities of the 
Commission.197 
When the federal Canadian HRA was passed, a special Human Rights Tribunal 
(Tribunal) was also created to have sole jurisdiction over the judicial adjudication of 
 
190 Id. See also Gould v. Yukon Order of Pioneers, [1996] S.C.R. 571 (“This Court has repeatedly stressed 
that it is inappropriate to solely rely on a strictly grammatical analysis, particularly with respect to the 
interpretation of legislation which is constitutional or quasi-constitutional in nature.”) 
191 See United Nations Association in Canada, Canada and Human Rights Website, supra note 181. 
192 Such as found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. (1948). 
193 See Canada and Human Rights Website, supra note 182.  
194 See Commission website, supra note 178. 
195 See generally id.
196 See, e.g., Quebec Human Rights Commission Website, Commission des droits de la personne et des 
droits de la jeunesse, at http://www.cdpdj.qc.ca (last visited Mar. 6, 2006). 
197 Commission website, supra note 178. 
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human rights violation cases.198 The Tribunal’s mission is “[t]o provide Canadians with 
an improved quality of life and an assurance of equal access to the opportunities that exist 
in our society through the fair-minded and equitable interpretation and enforcement of the 
Canadian Human Rights Act . . .”199 The Tribunal receives its mandate and funding 
directly from Parliament and operates as an independent agency separate from the 
HRC.200 The Tribunal operates in a similar fashion to a court; however, “as an 
administrative tribunal, the [Tribunal] has more flexibility than regular courts. This 
allows those who appear before it a chance to tell their cases more fully without having to 
follow strict rules of evidence.”201 All cases are referred to the Tribunal through the HRC, 
which is the starting point for all human rights violation complaints.202 The HRC may 
decide to act as the victim’s attorney (sometimes in a limited capacity) at a case before 
the tribunal; otherwise the victim is required to represent himself or herself alone, or be 
represented through an independent attorney.203 If one of the parties opposes the outcome 
of the case before the Tribunal, an appeal may be made to the Canadian Federal 
Courts.204 
While the above explanation of the federal Tribunal is helpful in understanding 
how human rights tribunals are conducted in Canada, schools are covered under the 
provincial human rights codes. 205 Thus, complainants of sexual harassment in 
 
198Canadian Human Rights Tribunal Website, at http://www.chrt-tcdp.gc.ca.  
199 Id. The Tribunal also interprets the Canadian Employment Equity Act. Referenced here is the federal 
Tribunal. Provincial tribunals operate in a similar manner; however, the laws and procedures for each 
province would need to be consulted to determine the intricate workings of the different provincial 
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educational environments in Canada would work through the complaint process within 
their province’s human rights code, commission and ultimately tribunal.206 The scope of 
this Article does not permit a recitation of how each province’s complaint and resolution 
process works, however, the complaint process established by the Ontario Human Rights 
Commission will be discussed briefly to give an idea of how a typical school sexual 
harassment complaint would be lodged in Canada. 
 In order to lodge a complaint in Ontario, the complainant first calls a hotline and 
speaks with Commission staff to see if the alleged discrimination falls under the Ontario 
Code.207 The complainant is then sent a form to complete, along with instructions 
regarding completion of that form.208 If the complaint is accepted by the Commission, 
after it receives an answer from the respondent, it will attempt to settle the dispute 
through mediation with the parties.209 If mediation is unsuccessful, the Commission will 
conduct an investigation and enter into a binding Conciliation process with the parties.210 
If this proves unsuccessful, the Commission will decide whether to refer the matter to the 
Ontario Human Rights Tribunal.211 Unlike the federal Commission, the Ontario 
Commission is an impartial body, and though it will present evidence from its 
investigation before the tribunal, it will not represent either party, though each party is 
entitled to his or her own legal counsel.212 
206 Id. 
207 Ontario Human Rights Commission, The Complaint Process, available at http://www.ohrc.on.ca/ 
english/complaints/index.shtml (last visited Feb. 3, 2006).  
208 Id.
209 Id. A complaint may not be accepted if it is untimely (occurring six months after the alleged incident(s) 
or it is made in bad faith, is frivolous, not within the Commission’s jurisdiction, or could be better brought 
under another piece of litigation. Id. Complainants may file a reconsideration for commission decisions not 
to accept a complaint. Id.
210 Id. 
211 Id. If the matter is not referred, either party may motion the Commission to reconsider that decision. Id.
212 Id.
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 D. The Evolution of Sexual Harassment Law in Canada 
 In Canada, sexual harassment is similarly legally considered discrimination on the 
basis of sex.213 The Supreme Court of Canada established this holding in Janzen v. Platy 
Enterprises Ltd.214 In Janzen, the complainants were subjected to constant physical and 
verbal sexual abuse while working as waitresses for the defendant; they consequently 
terminated their employment after complaints to their supervisor failed to ameliorate the 
situation.215 The Supreme Court of Canada decided Janzen not long after the United 
States Supreme Court initially determined that sexual harassment is considered sexual 
discrimination under Title VII, and thus came to an analogous conclusion under Canadian 
human rights law.216 
While the Janzen decision represented a positive course for human rights 
advocates in Canada, it created confusion in the lower courts regarding the human rights 
tribunals’ exclusive jurisdiction over human rights cases.217 The Supreme Court of 
Canada clarified the human rights tribunals’ jurisdiction over sexual harassment cases in  
213 See discussion of case law establishing this principle, infra Part III.D. This Article will examine the 
evolution of sexual harassment law in Canada in both the workplace and in schools. Because all sexual 
harassment complaints fall under the human rights legislation, there is no parallel development of sexual 
harassment law in Canada based on different statutes, as exists in the United States. Id. 
214 [1989] S.C.R. 1252. 
215 Id.
216 Id.; Meritor, 447 U.S. 57 (1986). The Janzen Court, however, did not accept the American Court’s 
differentiation between quid pro quo and hostile environment discrimination. Id. The court stated:  
I do not find this categorization particularly helpful. While the distinction may have been 
important to illustrate forcefully the range of behaviour that constitutes harassment at a 
time before sexual harassment was widely viewed as actionable, in my view there is no 
longer any need to characterize harassment as one of these forms. The main point in 
allegations of sexual harassment is that unwelcome sexual conduct has invaded the 
workplace, irrespective of whether the consequences of the harassment included a denial 
of concrete employment rewards for refusing to participate in sexual activity. 
Janzen, 1 S.C.R. at 1284. 
217 See Chamberlain, supra note 15, at 4. Chamberlain notes that plaintiffs initially brought cases under 
civil tort law, in addition to human rights law. Id.
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Board of Governors of Seneca College of Applied Arts and Technology v. Bhadauria,218 
holding that violations of human rights legislation may not be brought as civil actions, 
but only under the jurisdiction of human rights tribunals.219 Therefore, in Canada human 
rights cases only enter the traditional court system through appeal from a final tribunal 
decision.220 
Before examining sexual harassment discrimination under Human Rights 
Legislation in the context of schools, the Canadian courts first examined school board 
liability for discrimination of students based on race in the case of Ross v. New Brunswick 
School District No. 15 and Attis.221 In Ross, the Supreme Court of Canada held that a 
school district has a duty to provide a discrimination-free learning environment and 
therefore may be held liable for discriminatory behavior (in this case racial 
discrimination) on the part of a school employee.222 In Ross, the Court found that where 
the school district had failed to meaningfully discipline a racist teacher, a poisoned 
environment had been created that was characterized by a lack of equity and tolerance.223 
The Court further stated that “[a] school board has a duty to maintain a positive school 
environment for all persons served by it and it must be ever vigilant of anything that 
might interfere with this duty.”224 Likewise, the Canadian courts went on to find that a 
university could similarly be held liable for the sexual harassment of one of its students 
by a professor under the Newfoundland human rights code.225 
218 [1981] S.C.R. 193. 
219 Id.
220 See supra text accompanying note 204. 




225 Memorial University v. Rose [1990] 80 Nfld & P.E.I.R. 97 (Nfld S.C.T.D.). 
36
 Perhaps the most prominent sexual harassment case in Canada presently is North 
Vancouver School District No. 44 v. Jubran.226 This case was initially decided by the 
British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal, but was subsequently appealed to the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal.227 As the case involves peer sexual harassment, albeit based 
upon sexual orientation, it is being styled by at least one Canadian solicitor as the 
Canadian Davis test case for peer sexual harassment.228 
In Jubran, the victim filed a complaint with the British Columbia Human Rights 
Commission after he was repeatedly harassed, both physically and verbally, because his 
peers perceived him as a homosexual.229 At his secondary school, from grade eight to 
grade twelve, Jubran was “taunted with homophobic epithets and was physically 
assaulted, including being spit upon, kicked and punched by other students.”230 Even 
though the school recognized the harassment and disciplined a few of the perpetrators, it 
failed to effectively remedy the situation, as the harassment continued throughout 
Jubran’s high school career.231 
The court, employing a broad interpretation of the British Columbia Human 
Rights Code, held that even though Jubran was not a homosexual, harassment that was 
homophobic in nature was discriminatory.232 The court ordered that the school district 
pay Jubran compensatory damages, in addition to ordering the school district to “cease its 
 
226 [2005] B.C.J. No. 733.  
227 Id.
228 J. Paul R. Howard, School Board Liability for Student-Peer Harassment and Discrimination: 
“Deliberate Indifference” and Beyond?, at http://www.shibleyrighton.com/pdf/LiabilityStudent 
%20DiscrimOct2001.pdf (last visited Feb. 3. 2006). The author of this short internal article, a lawyer with 
the firm of Shibley Righton, LLP in Toronto, Ontario, and a Special Lecturer in Education Law at the 
Faculty of Law, University of Windsor, noted that the Canadian courts’ “current willingness to broaden the 
scope of school board liability for the misconduct, crimes or other legal wrongs committed by individuals.” 
Id. See Jacobi v. Griffiths [1999] D.L.R. 174 (4th); Bazley v. Curry [1999] D.L.R. 174 (4th). 
229 Jubran, B.C.J. No. 733 at 2. 
230 Id. at 2, 10-16. 
231 Id. at 17-19. 
232 Id. at 2. 
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contravention of the Code and refrain from committing the same or similar 
contravention.”233 
It is important to note that cases brought on a theory of sexual orientation 
harassment, such as Jubran, properly belong, and are relevant to a discussion about 
gender-based sexual harassment. 234 In fact, the Canadian HRA explicitly provides 
protection against discrimination based on sexual orientation.235 Both of these forms of 
harassment are rooted in the harassers’ expression of power and control over their victim. 
While harassment based on sexual orientation, perceived or not, may not seem like 
regular gender-based sexual harassment, it has the same deleterious effects on its 
 
233 Id. at 23. 
234 Just last year, in fact, one of the rare verdicts in a Title IX sexual harassment action (one of the two 
found under the Morelaw.com search, supra note 132) was brought under a peer sexual orientation-based 
harassment theory. See Theno v. Tonganoxie Unified Sch. Dist. No. 464, 394 F. Supp. 2d 1299 (Dist. Kan. 
2005).  A case was also brought under § 1983 for peer harassment based on sexual orientation that survived 
a summary judgment motion from defendants. See Flores v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 324 F.3d 1130 
(9th Cir. 2003). 
235 See Canadian Human Rights Commission, Grounds for Discrimination and Harassment, available at 
http://www.chrc-ccdp.ca/discrimination/sexual_orientation-en.asp (last visited Feb. 2, 2006). The provision 
was added to the HRA in 1996, nearly two decades after its addition was originally proposed. Id. Sexual 
orientation protection also exists at the provincial level in Canada. See, e.g., The Quebec Charter of 
Humans Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q.C-12, ch. I.1, § 10 (2006) (Can.). 
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victims.236 Additionally, it is important to also recognize orientation-based sexual 
harassment as inappropriate behavior; it is not just “boys being boys.”237 
E. The Benefits of the Placement of Sexual Harassment Discrimination under Human 
Rights Legislation in Canada 
 
The Canadian Supreme Court’s holding in Bhadauria squarely placed sexual 
harassment cases under the jurisdiction of human rights tribunals rather than the private 
civil litigation sphere.238 According to Erika Chamberlain, professor of law at University 
of Western Ontario, this categorization has created a tension concerning the proper 
jurisdictional home for sexual harassment cases.239 Chamberlain argues that tension is 
 
236 The court in Jubran recognized the negative effects of this particular kind of harassment above and 
beyond mere bullying. Jubran, B.C.J. No. 733. Referring to the Tribunal’s finding that harassment based on 
perceived homosexuality was discrimination based on sexual orientation the court stated:  
While the students may have used the terms ‘homo’ and ‘queer’ interchangeably with 
‘dork’ or ‘geek’, without reference to sexual orientation, the terms ‘queer’, ‘homo’ and 
‘faggot’, clearly carry homosexual overtones. The students acknowledged that the words 
often related to sexual orientation, were pejorative, and were intended to carry a sting. 
While not every action directed toward Mr. Jubran was accompanied by a homosexual 
statement or epithet, I agree with Mr. Jubran's counsel who argued that, for the most part, 
the name-calling had ‘at its basis a sense of his difference which was described frequently 
in homophobic terms.’ Whether or not the name-calling was intended to hurt is irrelevant, 
since it is the effect of the conduct, or action, not the intent of the harassers, that is 
relevant in determining whether discrimination has occurred. Ontario Human Rights 
Commission v. Simpson-Sears Ltd., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536. 
Id. at 3.   
237 See generally Vanessa H. Eisemann, Protecting the Kids in the Hall: Using Title IX to Stop Student-on-
Student Anti-Gay Harassment, 15 BERKELY WOMEN’S L.J. 125 (2000). Unfortunately, while a valid topic, 
a full discussion of sexual orientation based harassment in the context of schools is beyond the scope of this 
Article. However, it should also be noted that sexual harassment directed at males based on perceived 
homosexual orientation has as its basis harassment based on perceived feminine traits. Drobac interview, 
supra note 19. Thus, this particular kind of harassment is in a way closely related to traditional female 
sexual harassment. Id. The court’s instructions in Theno are particularly enlightening on this point:  
Title IX prohibits discrimination ‘on the basis of sex,’ which means gender-based 
harassment. Harassment is not discrimination based on sex merely because the words or 
gestures used have sexual content or connotation or are based upon sexual orientation or 
perceived sexual orientation. 
The harassment must be not merely tinged with offensive sexual connotations, but must 
actually constitute harassment based on gender. To constitute gender-based harassment 
under Title IX, the harasser must be motivated by Mr. Theno's gender or his failure to 
conform to stereotypical male characteristics. If you find that the harassers were so 
motivated, then you may conclude that the harassment was based on his gender. 
Theno, 394 F. Supp. 2d at 1302. 
238 Bhadauria, 124 D.L.R. (3d) 193. 
239 Chamberlain, supra note 15 at 3. 
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created because sexual harassment encompasses elements of both distributive and 
corrective justice.240 Chamberlain finds that the “former views sexual harassment as an 
issue of sexual equality, properly addressed by the human rights system with its public 
process and broad remedial powers.”241 “The latter describes it as a private injury that 
should be litigated through the adversarial system and compensated by damages.”242 
Ultimately, Chamberlain finds that, while sexual harassment cannot completely fit 
neatly into either category, sexual harassment properly belongs under the distributive 
theory because, even if it cannot afford victims the same level of compensation as the 
private civil tort system, the human rights tribunals have broader remedies available to 
them than at common law.243 These remedies, including education and affirmative action 
programs, help redress the historical harm that sex stereotypes have caused, and also help 
improve the situation of women and those facing sexual orientation discrimination 
generally.244 
Furthermore, while tribunals have the authority to order compensatory damages 
awards, the major focus of tribunal remedies is on the use of broad remedial powers to 
remove discriminatory environments and prevent future harm.245 As evidenced in the 
Nova Scotia Human Rights Act, a board of inquiry can order “any party who has 
contravened this Act to do any act or thing that constitutes full compliance with the Act 
and to rectify any injury caused to any person or class of person or make compensation 




242 Id. at 4. 
243 Id. at 20. 
244 Id. 
245 Id. at 19. 
246 R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 214, s. 3(o), as amended by S.N.S. 1991, c. 12. 
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the Jubran Tribunal set up a monitoring program with the school and the human rights 
commission of British Columbia.247 
Additionally, in recognizing the sensitive nature of many discrimination 
complaints, human rights tribunals are more flexible and informal in their proceedings 
than regular courts.248 The nature of these proceedings assists those bringing sexual 
harassment claims in general, and may in particular be of assistance to younger students 
bringing a complaint, who may be more intimidated by a full court proceeding.249 In sum, 
human rights tribunals have procedures in place that allow them to better handle 
discrimination and harassment complaints. 
IV. COMPARISON OF CANADIAN AND AMERICAN SYSTEMS 
A. Administrative Enforcement 
While the American OCR and the Canadian Commissions perform similar 
functions in administratively enforcing anti-sexual harassment discrimination laws in 
schools, the Canadian Commissions are organized in a more logical and efficient manner. 
While the American system has several different agencies that enforce civil rights 
legislation in different contexts,250 the Canadian human rights commissions bring all 
discrimination complaints under one umbrella, either in the provincial or the federal 
system.251 This system arguably makes it easier for victims of discrimination to know 
 
247 Jubran, [2002] B.C.H.R.T.D. No. 10.  
248 See Human Rights Tribunal Website, supra note 198. 
249 See, generally, id.
250 For example, at the federal level the EEOC enforces Title VII in the workplace, see www.eeoc.gov, 
HUD’s Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity enforces the Fair Housing Act, see 
http://www.hud.gov/offices/fheo/index.cfm, and the OCR enforces Titles VI and IX in education, see supra 
Part II.D. States also have their own anti-discrimination agencies. See, e.g., Indiana Civil Rights 
Commision, at http://www.in.gov/icrc/.  If you are a victim in the United States, unless you are an expert, it 
seems unlikely that you would know where to file your complaint without at least some preliminary 
research.  
251 See supra Part III.C.  
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where to file a complaint, as there is only one agency involved no matter what the context 
of the discrimination. Moreover, whereas the different anti-discrimination agencies of the 
Unites States are at the whim of the priorities of the political groups in office, Canadian 
commissions, as they are organized into one anti-discrimination enforcement group, may 
wield more combined power in achieving their goals.252 This concept is evidenced by the 
noticeable disparity in the name recognition value and power wielded between the EEOC 
and the OCR, even though each agency was created to combat the same evil, only in 
different settings.253 
B. Judicial Enforcement 
In the United States, students may bring suit to recover damages and injunctive 
relief under Title IX for sexual harassment suffered in schools.254 However, many victims 
are arguably deterred from filing because either the standard of recovery for damages is 
extremely high or the standard of recovery for injunctive relief has not clearly been 
articulated.255 Alternatively, in Canada, civil human right suits do not exist as Canadians 
address human rights complaints in special human rights tribunals, which are completely 
separate system from normal civil litigation.256 Thus, the human rights tribunals, though 
impartial, are in a particularly good position to properly adjudicate discrimination 
complaints because their sole jurisdiction and experience is in human rights law.257 
Furthermore, student sexual harassment complainants may not be as inhibited in 
Canada because the standard for recovery against a school board in a tribunal setting is a 
 
252 Drobac interview, supra note 19. 
253 See discussion of the EEOC and OCR supra Part II.D. 
254 See supra, Part II.B. 
255 See, generally, Gebser, (Stevens, J., dissenting); Rhode, supra note 1.  
256 See Canadian Human Rights Tribunal Website, supra note 198. 
257 See Chamberlain, supra note 15. 
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showing that the school board failed to provide an educational environment that was free 
from discriminatory harassment.258 If this legal standard is met, both injunctive and 
compensatory relief may be granted.259 Also, Canadian complainants do not have to 
choose whether to file a civil action or an administrative complaint; the system is 
streamlined to funnel all complaints though the Commission for administrative remedy or 
resolution at a tribunal. 260 Thus, complainants are not forced to make some kind of 
strategic decision regarding how they will proceed with their complaint.  
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
Even though Title IX has had over thirty years to eliminate discrimination on the 
basis of sex in America’s schools,261 under the present system in the United States, 
students who suffer sexual harassment at school have little recourse if their school has no 
sexual harassment grievance policy in place, or if that policy does not work.262 While the 
Supreme Court decisions in Gebser and Davis were progressive in that they recognized 
that recovery is available in both student-teacher and student-student sexual harassment 
situations, the legal standards of recovery established by those cases detract from other 
possible remedies that might better effectuate the goals of Title IX.263 Likewise, while the 
OCR is in a position to enforce implementation of Title IX sexual harassment 
compliance, it has largely failed to do so.264 Thus, sexual harassment continues to exist at 
 
258 Jubran, B.C.J. No. 733 at 2; see also Ross, 1 S.C.R. 825.  
259 See Chamberlain, supra note 15, at 19. 
260 Remember that in the United States, victims may choose either to file a complaint with the OCR, file a 
civil suit, or both. See supra Part II.D. 
261 Title IX was enacted as part of the Education Amendments of 1972. See 28 U.S.C. § 1681(a) et seq.
(1972). 
262 See License for Bias, supra note 11.  
263 Drobac interview, supra note 19. 
264 See License for Bias, supra note 11. 
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high levels in American schools because Title IX has been emasculated by poor 
administrative and confusing judicial enforcement.265 
In fixing this problem, the Unites States should look to the Canadian Human 
Rights system of anti-discrimination enforcement. The Unites States should streamline its 
system of antidiscrimination agencies to better enable victims to seek help, and also 
enable agencies to resolve harm and eliminate discrimination.266 While President George 
W. Bush recognized that federal agencies in the business of national security and law 
enforcement belong under one organizational umbrella267, an analogous push has never 
been made to bring together the agencies that enforce civil rights laws.  
 The United States legislature and/or courts should also articulate a less rigorous 
standard of recovery under Title IX for sexual harassment plaintiffs seeking injunctive or 
declaratory relief.268 The present direction of the case law, where focus is almost entirely 
placed on seeking compensatory damages, muddies the issue.269 While it is important to 
compensate victims, it is arguably more important to hold schools accountable for Title 
IX requirements.270 Unfortunately, under the present system, where the spotlight is on 
judicially preventing financial liability and therefore protecting the school board purse, 
school boards are under little pressure to enact Title IX sexual harassment reporting, 
education and grievance policies.271 
265 Drobac interview, supra note 19. 
266 Id. 
267 The Department of Homeland Security was created in 2002, after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001. See George W. Bush, The Department of Homeland Security (June 2002), available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/book.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2006).  
268 Drobac interview, supra note 19. 
269 Id.
270 Id.
271 See, generally, Rhode, supra note 1. 
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 In sum, a clearly articulated reasonableness or negligence standard for injunctive 
relief against school boards would allow a plaintiff to more easily and quickly force his 
or her school into compliance.272 Again, while compensation is important, perhaps it is 
more important to provide the plaintiff, and his or her classmates, a harassment-free 
environment for learning.273 
272 Drobac interview, supra note 19. 
273 Id.
